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In recent years, the Islamic finance industry has attracted the attention of policy makers and international donors as a possible channel through which to expand financial inclusion, particularly among Muslim adults. Yet crosscountry, demand-side data on actual usage and preference gaps in financial services between Muslims and nonMuslims have been scarce. This paper uses novel data to explore the use of and demand for formal financial services among self-identified Muslim adults. In a sample of more than 65,000 adults from 64 economies (excluding countries where less than 1 percent or more than 99 percent of the sample self-identified as Muslim), the analysis finds that Muslims are significantly less This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at lklapper@worldbank.org.
likely than non-Muslims to own a formal account or save at a formal financial institution after controlling for other individual-and country-level characteristics. But the analysis finds no evidence that Muslims are less likely than non-Muslims to report formal or informal borrowing. Finally, in an extended survey of adults in five North African and Middle Eastern countries with relatively nascent Islamic finance industries, the study finds little use of Sharia-compliant banking products, although it does find evidence of a hypothetical preference for Sharia-compliant products among a plurality of respondents despite higher costs.
Introduction
Although Islamic financial assets represent less than 1 percent of total global financial assets, total funds were valued at $1.3 trillion in 2011, a 150 percent increase over five years (Reuters, 2011) . Policymakers around the world have noted this trend of rapid and sustained growth. For instance, in a 2012 op-ed, then-World Bank Managing Director Mahmoud
Mohieldin wrote that Islamic finance "has the potential to meet more people's banking and investment needs, expand its reach, and contribute to greater financial stability and inclusion in the developing world" (Mohieldin, 2012) . In March of 2013, the International Finance
Corporation announced its first partnership with an Islamic finance institution in Sub-Saharan Africa, a $5 million equity investment with Gulf African Bank in Kenya with the explicit goal of expanding Sharia-compliant banking products and services to small and medium businesses (IFC, 2013) .
Much of this work is based on the premise that Muslims prefer financial services and products that are consistent with their religious beliefs, chief among them the prohibition on interest, or riba, stipulated in the Quran. Yet little empirical research has been done to measure the degree to which Muslims are currently not accessing conventional financial systems, or how much they demand and use Sharia-compliant financial products, particularly within the realm of household finance. Even less is known about how these usage gaps and preferences vary between various financial products and across regions and countries. A more complete understanding of these concepts can help Islamic finance industry leaders better expand their outreach to Muslim clients, and aid policymakers in more clearly defining their role in expanding financial inclusion -Islamic or otherwise -to Muslim adults.
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This paper seeks to answer several questions relevant to the Islamic finance industry: (1)
Are Muslims less likely than non-Muslims to use formal financial services in their current form?
(2) Do unbanked Muslims differ from unbanked non-Muslims in their self-reported barriers to financial inclusion? (3) To what degree do these patterns vary across countries and individuallevel characteristics? In a limited sample of countries, we are also able to empirically investigate: (4) How prevalent is awareness and use of Sharia-compliant financial products? (5) To what degree are Muslims willing to pay a premium for Sharia-compliant financial products and services?
We draw our dataset from the Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) and Gallup
World Poll databases. In order to examine variation between Muslims and non-Muslims within countries, we exclude from our sample countries where less than one percent or more than 99 percent of the adult population self-identifies as a Muslim. individual-level characteristics, including self-reported religion, gender, age, income, education, employment status, and measures of religiosity. Importantly, our within-country analysis allows us to identify the effect of religion on the use of formal financial services separately from the effect of macro-or institutional-level attributes.
In our sample of countries, we find no evidence that Muslims are less likely than nonMuslims to report formal borrowing or indeed any form of borrowing, when controlling for other individual-and country-level characteristics. We do find, however, that Muslims are significantly less likely than non-Muslims to have an account and save at a formal financial institution, when controlling for other individual-and country-level characteristics. Selfidentification as a Muslim is associated with a 6 percent decrease in the probability of having a formal account, which is larger than the gap between men and women and roughly equal to that of an exogenous shift from the third to the first (lowest) within-country income quintile.
However, we find no evidence that patterns of financial inclusion in subpopulations that are typically excluded from formal financial systems (women, the less educated, the poor, and rural residents) are any different among Muslim populations than among non-Muslims.
We find that Muslims are more likely than non-Muslims to report religion as a barrier to account ownership, however this result appears to be mainly driven by respondents in SubSaharan Africa. Worldwide, just 7 percent of unbanked Muslims and unbanked non-Muslims cite religion as a barrier to account ownership. Similar to non-Muslims, Muslims are more likely to cite cost, distance, and documentation as barriers to account ownership. Relatedly, we do not find evidence that a respondent's degree of religiosity plays a particularly important role in the financial behaviors of Muslims as compared to their non-Muslim counterparts, however our data on religiosity does have important limitations.
Finally, we do not find any evidence that gaps between Muslims and non-Muslims in financial inclusion are related to economy-level variation in the size of the Islamic finance industry or the percentage of Muslims within a given country that self-identify as Muslim.
An important caveat to the above findings is that we cannot distinguish between conventional and Sharia-compliant financial products when examining the use of formal financial services. It is possible that the absence of a gap in borrowing behavior is the result of widespread availability and use of Sharia-compliant products, however given that less than 1 percent of total global financial assets (and less than 1 percent of microfinance products) are from Islamic financial institutions we do not believe this to be the case (El-Zoghbi and Tarazi, 2013) . Rather it seems more plausible that the vast majority of financially included Muslims use conventional banking products and services.
However, in a smaller, separate dataset based on interviews with over 5,000 adults in five
Middle Eastern and North African countries (collected in 2012), we are able to make the distinction between Sharia-compliant and conventional financial products. We find very little use of Islamic banking products though we do see evidence of a strong hypothetical preference for Sharia-compliant products despite higher costs. Just 2 percent of adults in these countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen) report currently using a Sharia-compliant banking service. In a hypothetical scenario, a plurality (45 percent) of respondents reports a preference for a Sharia-compliant banking product over a less expensive conventional banking product. However, 37 percent of respondents prefer a conventional product or have no preference which suggests that demand for Sharia-compliant products is not immune to cost concerns. We also document significant variations in awareness and usage of Sharia-compliant banking products: income and access to information channels are particularly important predictors of these behaviors. Importantly, these five countries may not be representative of use of and attitudes towards Islamic finance globally. Other economies -Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Sudan, among them -are at distinctly different stages with respect to the development of the Islamic finance industry.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on preference and usage gaps in formal financial services among Muslims and also contains a review of the differences between conventional and Islamic finance. Section 3 introduces the data, provides summary statistics, and reviews our empirical strategy. Section 4 contains our results and section 5 concludes.
Background and Literature Review

Preference and Usage Gaps
We first review the demand-side aspect of potential divergent preferences for and usage There is significantly less agreement, however, when it comes to quantifying these groups. Naser, Jamal, and al-Khatib (1999) in Egypt found that take-up and repayment rates of an Islamic ROSCA were higher than that of a conventional Grameen-style group (El Gamal, El Komi, Karlan, and Osma, 2011) .
On the other end of the spectrum, Haron, Ahmed, and Planisek (1994) find that there are no significant differences between Muslims and others in Malaysia in their choice of a bank.
They find that Muslim bank customers selected banks based mainly on non-religious criteria such as the quality of services, the speed of transactions, and the reputation of the bank. And in Singapore, Gerrard and Cunningham observes that about two-thirds of Muslims consider economic as well as religious factors in deciding to patronize an Islamic bank.
While much of this previous work -particularly that from Middle Eastern and North
African countries -suggests that there is a demand for Sharia-compliant services among Muslims, the robustness of this demand and its relationship to cost and availability of alternative, conventional products is not well understood. What exactly is meant by Islamic finance is also not always clear to respondents of these surveys. Naser et al. (1999) The lack of standardized survey methodologies and questions in the current literature make it difficult to draw broad-based conclusions about the demand and use for financial services among Muslims. However, Seibel (2005) , citing the case of Indonesia, points out that the correlation between ex-ante demand for Sharia-compliant products may not be correlated with the success of the Islamic finance industry once it is introduced and developed.
Other demand-side hypotheses on preference and usage gaps between Muslims and nonMuslims have been put forth, but these generally confound religious identification with other individual-and country-level attributes. For example, in countries where Muslim adults have less income or education than their non-Muslim counterparts, it is possible that preference and usage gaps for formal financial services might arise due to issues of banking access, creditworthiness, and demand for certain products and services. It is also frequently cited that adults in Muslim-majority countries are less financially included than adults in other countries. However, given that the goal of this paper is to isolate the relationship between Muslim identity and preferences for and usage of formal financial services, that is, after accounting for other individual-and country-level characteristics, we will not review these theories or literature here.
There are, however, nontrivial supply-side considerations when examining the role of religion -or any individual characteristic -in the use of formal financial services. Becker (1957) is credited with developing the first theoretical framework of discrimination in wage, employment, and financial markets and a rich theoretical and empirical literature has since followed exploring discrimination in credit markets (see Peterson, 1981; Munnell, 1996; Cavalluzzo, 1998 that other Islamic institutions, such as laws relating to commercial partnerships, the waqf system, and the Islamic inheritance system, were more significant impediments on financial development (see Kuran (2005) for a detailed discussion). Of particular relevance to the topic of this paper is the impact of interest prohibitions on levels of financial inclusion. In one of the few empirical studies on this topic, Grosjean (2011) finds evidence that former Ottomon countries and provinces still experience lower levels of banking penetration as a result of interest-lending prohibitions that lasted longer than in the rest of Europe.
Although widespread, strictly-enforced prohibitions on interest-lending were relaxed in the 19 th century, the focus on interest-free lending experienced something of a reemergence with the development of "Islamic economics" in the 1940s (Kuran, 1997 At the bank-level, Beck et al (2013) find few differences in business orientation, efficiency, asset quality, or stability between conventional and Islamic banks. However, the authors do find evidence that higher capitalization and liquidity reserves contributed to the relatively better performance of Islamic banks during the recent crisis.
Among the most common present day Islamic banking products are partnership asset financing arrangements between a bank and a client. Under a Murabaha contract, the financial institution purchases the desired good for the customer and then sells it to the customer in monthly installments at the original price plus an agreed mark-up. As opposed to a traditional interest payment, the monthly installments remain fixed at the initial amount even in the case of delayed payment. It has been estimated that the vast majority (70 to 80 percent) of Islamic finance lending products are Murabaha-based (Ray, 1995; Fu et al., 2011; El-Zoghbi and Tarazi, 2013) .
Under the Mudaraba contract, the bank provides the resources, i.e. the "capital", while the client provides effort and expertise with profits shared at a predetermined ratio. wherein the owner of the account does not explicitly receive interest, but rather shares in the overall profits of the financial institution or a specific investment account on the asset side of the financial institution's balance sheet.
Data and Methodology
Data
This paper Though the 2011 Global Findex and Gallup World Poll database covers more than 150,000 respondents in 148 economies, the database used in this paper is considerably smaller.
First, we do not have data on respondents' religion in nine, mostly Middle Eastern, countries.
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The missing data is due to restrictions placed on the survey by the governments of these countries. Second, because we are examining within-country variation in financial inclusion between Muslims and non-Muslims, we exclude countries where less than one percent or more than 99 percent of the sample self-identified as a Muslim (56 and 10 countries, respectively).
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Finally, we exclude countries where more than 20 percent of the population is excluded from sampling and countries where other key demographic covariates are not available (two and seven countries, respectively). 13 We are left with a dataset covering 66,484 respondents in 64 countries.
Taken together, these 64 countries account for 75 percent of the world's Muslim population.
We also analyze additional data collected by Gallup and the World Bank in five Middle
Eastern and North Africa countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen) in 2012.
These data -based on roughly 1,000 interviews in each country -focus more specifically on awareness, use, and preferences for Islamic banking services. Importantly, with the exception of five countries in which additional questions were asked, we cannot distinguish between Islamic and conventional financial services. We are also constrained by the inherent subjectivity and biases present in questions about a respondents religious practices and beliefs. There are some nontrivial differences between Muslims and non-Muslims with respect to several basic individual characteristics. In univariate t-tests in our entire sample (not shown), we find that Muslims are significantly more likely than non-Muslims to have only a primary education or less (53 percent vs. 43 percent) and to be married (60 percent vs. 53 percent).
Summary Statistics
Muslims are significantly less likely than non-Muslims to be employed by an employer (24 percent vs. 32 percent) and have internet access in their home (18 percent vs. 36 percent).
Muslims in our sample also live in larger households, on average, than non-Muslims (4.53 vs.
3.38 members). Notably, there are no significant differences in univaritate ttests between Muslims and non-Muslims for income, urban residence, born in another country, mobile phone ownership, or television ownership.
The main financial inclusion variables used in this analysis are formal account, formal saving, and formal credit. Table 3 includes univariate ttests testing the equality of within country/region averages between Muslims and non-Muslims for these three variables.
Importantly, these results do not control for other individual-and country-level characteristics as do the results presented in the next section. The number of observations and percentage of a given region or country that self-identifies as Muslim should also be taken into consideration when interpreting significant differences.
Thirty-six percent of adults in our sample have an account at a formal financial institution (24 percent of Muslims, 44 percent of non-Muslims). 15 The gap in account penetration between
Muslims and non-Muslims is widest in the East Asia and Pacific region (48 percent and 21 percent, respectively). 15 percent of adults in our sample report having saved at a formal financial institution in the past 12 months (19 percent of Muslims, 9 percent of non-Muslims).
16
Nine percent of adults in our sample report having borrowed from a formal financial institution in the past 12 months (9 percent of Muslims, 7 percent of non-Muslims). 17 Of those who report not having an account at a formal financial institution, 6 percent of respondents (both Muslim and non-Muslim) report that religion is an important reason for not having an account.
18 15 The survey question on formal accounts is: "Do you, either by yourself or together with someone else, currently have an account at a bank, credit union, or another financial institution? An account can be used to save money, to make or receive payments, or to receive wages and remittances." We also consider those who report having a debit card or those who report having saved at a microfinance institution to have a formal account. 16 The survey question on formal saving is: "In the past 12 months, have you saved or set any money?" Those who respond in the affirmative are then asked, "In the past 12 months have you saved or set aside money using an account at a bank, credit union, or microfinance institution?" 17 The survey question on formal borrowing is: "In the past 12 months, have you borrowed any money from a bank, credit union, However, just 2 percent of respondents reported currently using an Islamic banking service. 21 In no country did this value exceed 3 percent. Among those who separately reported having an account at a formal financial institution or having borrowed from a formal financial institution in the past year, just 8 percent reported currently using an Islamic banking service. This is consistent with the low concentration of Islamic banking services in these countries as with work by Beck et al. (2012) which shows that in Egypt and Tunisia, Islamic banks' share of total bank assets is 4.2 and 1.5 percent, respectively. Islamic banks' share of total bank assets in Yemen is 51.5 percent, though this is mostly concentrated in non-commercial assets.
The third and final question in the module examined the robustness of demand for banking services. Indeed, those who had not heard of Islamic finance products were twice as likely to respond "don't know" to the hypothetic preference question.
Taken together, the results from the Islamic finance module suggest that individual-level use of Islamic banking services is extremely low in these countries. This is consistent with supply-side data. And while a plurality of respondents do report a preference for Islamic banking services despite significantly higher costs, an almost equally large share of adults prefer the cheaper, conventional loan or do not have a preference between the two. This suggests that there is likely to be demand for both conventional and Islamic banking services, and that preferences for Sharia-compliant products are influenced by price. Ideally, we would be able to estimate the elasticity of demand for Islamic products using an array of pricing options but this was not feasible in the current exercise. Finally, it should again be noted that these results are not representative of Islamic banking globally; in many countries, use of and attitudes towards Islamic finance are likely markedly different.
Empirical Strategy
We investigate the degree to which Muslims and non-Muslims differ in their use of financial services using a simple model examining the relationship between a respondent's ownership or use of a given financial product and whether or not the respondent identifies as a Muslim. We estimate the following model:
where y is defined as one of several dimensions of financial inclusion for individual i in country j. Our variable-of-interest, muslim, is a binary variable with a value equal to one if the respondent self-identifies as a Muslim. We include a vector of individual controls (δ i ) including age, age squared, log household size, and binary variables denoting gender, married, education (separate variables for having completed secondary and tertiary education), within-economy income quintile dummies (poorest quintile as excluded category), urban residence, employment status, household has a television, household has a mobile phone, and a dummy signifying whether or not the respondent was born outside of the country in which he currently resides.
In addition, we estimate the model using country fixed effects (η j ). Therefore we are examining differences within countries in the use of formal financial services between Muslims and non-Muslims. Previous analyses of the gap in the use of formal financial services between these two groups Muslims has tended to focus on comparing Muslim majority countries with Muslim minority countries, which runs the risk of confusing country-level differences with individual-level, religion-driven differences. Of course, even after controlling for other individual-level and country-level differences, we are cautious not to interpret the observed correlations as causal effects. Of particular concern is the omitted variable critique in which an omitted variable causes individuals both to identify as a Muslim and to behave in a certain way.
As noted in Guiso et al (2003) , this omitted, or latent, variable can be transmitted from parents to children (either genetically or through education). Thus we are careful not to ascribe a causal relationship between a respondent's religion and his use of formal financial services; rather we interpret our results as precisely estimated partial correlations. ε i,c is a normally distributed error term with zero mean and variance equal to 1. We account for individual-level probability weights in the regressions, but do not weight each country's sample by national population levels although the results are robust to this specification except when explicitly stated otherwise. We cluster standard errors at the country level.
The second step of our analyses is to test whether there are significant interactive affects between identification as Muslim and other individual-level characteristics. Specifically, we focus on the interaction of the following variables with our Muslim variable: religion important, female, low income, primary education only, and rural. We use the following model, where Ζ i is one of five individual-level variables.
Finally, we test whether there are significant interactive affects between identification as Muslim and country-level characteristics. We look at the percentage of total banking assets belonging to as Islamic finance institution, proportion of population that self-identifies as Muslim, and a Muslim-minority binary variable. We use the following model, where Π c is one of three country-level variables.
Because some our results include interaction terms we do not show marginal effects in the tables although they are cited in the text. Marginal effects for regressions without interaction terms are available on request.
Results
Use of Financial Services among Muslims and non-Muslims
In the previous section we documented gaps in the usage of formal financial services between Muslims and non-Muslims. Here, we use multivariate regression analysis to empirically investigate whether these gaps are statistically significant after controlling for individual-and country-level characteristics. Table 5 contains the first set of regression results. All results are probit estimations. We find a statistically significant and economically meaningful gap between Muslims and nonMuslims in the use of some formal financial services but not others. In column 1, we find no difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in the use of formal credit, that is, whether the respondent reports having borrowed money from a formal financial institution in the past year. In columns 2 and 3, we find that Muslims are no less likely than non-Muslims to report any type of borrowing activity in the past year from family or friends or from a range of sources, including formal financial institutions, family or friends, retail outlets using store or installment credit, an employer, or an informal private lender. We also test the latter three of these borrowing sources individually and find no significant differences between Muslims and non-Muslims (not shown).
The results in column 4 show that Muslims are significantly less likely than non-Muslims to report owning, either by themselves or jointly with another person, an account at a formal financial institution. The result is significant at the 1% level and economically significant: selfidentification as a Muslims is associated with a 6 percent decrease in the probability of having a formal account (marginal effects are not shown). This magnitude of the difference is larger than the gender gap and is roughly equal to that of an exogenous shift from the third to the first (lowest) income quintile.
We find that unbanked Muslims are more likely than unbanked non-Muslims to report not having an account at a formal financial institution because of religious reasons (column 5), however this result is not robust to the use of country-level population weights and appears to be driven largely by a handful of countries, as discussed in the next section. The lack of robustness of this demand-side religious constraint paired with the robustness of a gap in account penetration may suggest that supply-side biases (i.e. discrimination or lack of access to financial institutions) may explain the gap in formal account ownership between Muslims and nonMuslims.
Finally, we find that Muslims are less likely than non-Muslims to report having saved in the past year at a formal financial institution (column 6). To rule out the possibly that this difference is a product of differences in general savings behavior, we separately test whether Muslims are less likely than non-Muslims to save by any means and find no significant difference (results not shown).
The significant differences in account ownership and formal savings activity compared to the absence of differences in formal borrowing behavior is somewhat surprising given the asset finance focus of Islamic finance, which seems to suggest that this area has the largest demand for Sharia-compliant products. One explanation is that Sharia-compliant loans are sufficiently available that religion is no longer a constraint in access to or use of credit, which could be in contrast to the relative lack of availability of Sharia-compliant savings products. Indeed, most
Islamic microfinance institutions (MFIs) (like conventional MFIs) are not permitted to take deposits. Another possibility is that because credit pressures are often greater than savings pressures, Muslims are more likely to use conventional credit products than they are for savings products. A Muslim adult may be willing to procure a conventional credit product in the case of an emergency or to make an important investment. In contrast, there is generally less urgency when it comes to acquiring conventional savings product thus it may be easier to adhere to religious standards prohibiting their use. Unfortunately, we are not able directly to test these hypotheses with the currently available data.
Next, we investigate the robustness of these results across different regions. Table 6 contains the main results. In general, the results from Table 5 than 25 percent of the population, and less than 10 percent of the population) and interact these with the Muslim binary variable. In each of these tests, we find no evidence that the gap in usage of formal financial products is related to the percentage of a country's population that is Muslim (not shown).
Individual-and Country-level H
Use of and Attitude toward Sharia-Compliant Finance Products
In a limited sample of countries -Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen -we are able to empirically investigate awareness and usage of Sharia-compliant financial products as well as attitudes towards Sharia-compliant vs. conventional financial products. We follow a methodology similar to that used in section 4.1. Our dependent variables denote whether the respondent is aware of Islamic banks, uses a Sharia-compliant banking service, and his or her choice when presented with a hypothetical loan between a (more expensive) Sharia-compliant product and a conventional product. As noted in section 3.2, 48 percent of adults in the sample report being aware of Islamic banks and 2 percent of adults report using a Sharia-compliant financial service. Given a hypothetical choice between a Sharia-compliant loan and a cheaper conventional loan, 45 percent of respondents prefer the Sharia-compliant loan, 27 percent prefer the conventional loan, 10 percent do not have a preference, and 17 percent do not know, or refuse to answer. 99 percent of respondents in the sample self-identify as a Muslim. Table 7 shows our empirical results. Unlike previous tables, we now report coefficients of the country fixed effects. We find that married, wealthier, more educated, and adults in the labor force are more likely to report being aware of Islamic banks in their country (column 1).
Living in an urban area and in a home with a television and access to the internet is also positively related to awareness of Islamic banks, possibly indicating that these adults are more informed to the development of Islamic finance industries in their countries. The relationship between age and awareness of Islamic banks is positive although the coefficient on the age-squared coefficient is negative, indicating highest awareness among middle-aged adults. Adults living in Yemen were particularly likely to be aware of Sharia-compliant financial products, which is not surprising given that the Islamic finance industry in that country comprises a much larger percentage of the financial sector than in other countries (Beck et al, 2013) . Respondents in Algeria (the excluded category) are the least likely to report having heard of Sharia-compliant banking products, after controlling for individual characteristics.
Next, we examine the relationship between several individual characteristics and whether or not the respondent reports currently using a Sharia-compliant banking service. Overall, this is reported by just two percent of respondents. Unlike awareness of Islamic banks, females are significantly less likely to report using a Sharia-compliant banking service. Unfortunately we are not able to test whether this is a demand-or supply-side bias. Income is significantly and positively related to use of a Sharia-compliant banking service, though the relationship is not as strong. Living in a home with a television and access to the internet is also again strongly associated with using a Sharia-compliant banking service. Paradoxically, despite the lowest awareness of Sharia-compliant banking products, adults living in Algeria were the most likely to report using a Sharia-compliant banking product, though the country fixed effect coefficient is not statistically distinguishable from that of Egypt.
Finally, we look at what individual characteristics are associated with preferences for Sharia-compliant financial products (despite higher costs). We include a second column for each response option which also controls for the respondents current level of financial inclusion as well as their awareness and use of Sharia-compliant banking products. Few non-financial individual characteristics stand out as strongly associated with a preference for Sharia-compliant products. However, adults with a formal loan, adults who are aware of Islamic banks, and adults who currently use a Sharia-compliant banking product are significantly more likely to choose the more expensive Sharia-compliant loan over the cheaper conventional loan. Somewhat paradoxically, account ownership is negatively related to preference for Sharia-compliant banking products. Adults living in Algeria and Morocco were the most likely to state a preference for the Sharia-compliant loan.
Adults who chose the conventional loan were more likely to have just a primary education or less and more likely to live in rural area. Tunisian adults were particularly likely to report a preference for the conventional loan. Males and those living in urban areas were less likely to report not having a preference.
Taking these results together, it is clear that income and access to information appear to be strongly associated with awareness and usage related to Islamic finance. Adults in the higher income quintiles and those living in a home with a television and access to the internet are more likely than others to be aware of Islamic banks and use a Sharia-compliant financial product.
Further, adults who are familiar with or use Sharia-compliant products are significantly more likely to prefer these products though of course it is difficult to separate out the cause and effect.
It is possible that those more inclined to use these products have already sought them out, or that those with access to Sharia-compliant finance products have made use of them and are satisfied with their experience. With regard to other individual-level characteristics, the regression results do not present any clear patterns about adults' preference for Sharia-compliant banking products beyond what is evident from the summary statistics. This is perhaps attributable to the lack of clarity surrounding what is meant by Sharia-compliant finance (as discussed in section 2) and may also relate to financial illiteracy more generally.
Conclusion
This paper set out to answer five questions: First, are Muslims less likely than nonMuslims to use formal financial services in their current form? In a sample of over 65,000 adults from 64 economies, representing 75 percent of the world's adult Muslim population (excluding countries with less than 1 percent or more than 99 percent Muslim populations), we find that Muslims are significantly less likely than non-Muslims to own a formal account or save at a formal financial institution when controlling for other individual-and country-level characteristics. However, we find no evidence that Muslims in our sample are less likely than non-Muslims to report formal borrowing or indeed any form of borrowing.
Second, do unbanked Muslims differ from unbanked non-Muslims in their self-reported barriers to financial inclusion? We find that Muslims are more likely than non-Muslims to report religion as a barrier to account ownership; however, this result appears to be mainly driven by likely than non-Muslims to borrow formally but no less likely to have a formal account. We do not find any evidence that gaps between Muslims and non-Muslims in financial inclusion are larger among women, the poor, or rural residents, nor do we find that the size of these gaps are related to economy-level variation in the size of the Islamic finance industry or the percentage of Muslims within a given country that self-identify as Muslim.
Fourth, how prevalent are awareness and use of Sharia-compliant financial products? In a limited sample of countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen) we find that only two percent of adults report using an Sharia-compliant banking service although 48 percent of adults say that they have heard of Islamic banks in their country that offer services to people like them. We find that income and access to information are strongly and positively associated with awareness and use of Sharia-compliant banking products.
Fifth, to what degree are Muslims willing to pay a premium for Sharia-compliant financial products and services? In the same smaller sample, we find evidence of a hypothetical preference for Sharia-compliant products among a plurality of respondents despite higher costs.
However, 37 percent of respondents report that they would prefer a cheaper conventional loan or that they have no preference.
There is wide scope for future research on this topic. To begin, additional research is needed to investigate whether the differences that exist between Muslims and non-Muslims in the usage of financial products are demand-or supply-driven. The significant and economically meaningful gap in account penetration between Muslims and non-Muslims paired with the generally insignificant gap in reporting religion to be a barrier to account ownership suggests that constraints may be supply-driven, yet we are unable to formally test this hypothesis with our data.
Our results also raise the question of whether a gap exists between Muslims and nonMuslims in the ownership of formal accounts but not in formal credit products due to divergent "urgencies of need" with respect to savings and payments vs. borrowing. We hypothesize -but are unable to formally test -that this difference in usage gaps between borrowing and account ownership/formal saving is attributable to the unique demand-side pressures inherent in borrowing that might supersede religious considerations to the extent they exist, i.e. that a Muslim adult might be willing to procure a conventional credit product in the case of an emergency or to make an important investment. 24 In contrast, there is generally less urgency when it comes to acquiring conventional savings product thus it may be easier to adhere to religious standards prohibiting their use.
Additional cross-country, demand-side data (particularly in countries where the Islamic finance industry is more developed) on the use of and preferences for Sharia-compliant finance products would also be valuable in better understanding the variation in the demand for Shariacompliant finance products among Muslim adults. Survey instruments that can vary price and other hypothetical product features would allow researchers to determine elasticities of demand for certain financial products, Sharia-compliant and otherwise. Finally, time-series data that can track the development of Islamic finance industries across countries and the accompanying shifts in demand-side usage of and attitudes towards Sharia-compliant financial products would provide insight into the relationship between Islamic finance and the broader financial inclusion agenda. The table replicates Table 5 , by region. Each regression controls for all the variables shown in Table 5 and only "Muslim (0/1)" is shown. The dependent variable is listed at the top of each column. All variables are defined in Table 1 . Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) is not included in columns 3-8. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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